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 Non-technical Summary 
Investment in research and development (R&D) is usually considered to be subject to 
financing constraints due to outcome uncertainty leading to asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders. Moreover, R&D investment typically has a low inside collateral value 
as it is sunk once expensed. These arguments on market failures are often used to justify 
governmental intervention in the market for R&D through subsidy grants and tax credits. 
While the empirical literature on detecting financial constraints for R&D is vast, results are 
often ambiguous. We argue that the inconclusiveness may be due to heterogeneity among 
R&D investments that has been neglected in previous literature.  
We account for such heterogeneity of R&D investments by grouping the sample into 
potentially constrained and unconstrained firms based on Kamien and Schwartz (1978). 
According to this distinction, the former -defensive R&D- firms, are less likely to face 
financial constraints for their activities than the latter -offensive R&D- firms. Since large 
innovations involving basic research require significantly more resources, are much riskier in 
terms of default and expected returns, and are more prone to secrecy issues, the acquisition of 
external capital may be curtailed. If this applies empirically, it has strong implications for 
innovation policy. As cutting-edge innovations are typically seen as the driving force of 
technological progress and long-term growth, it is questionable whether current policy 
practice aimed at alleviating financial constraints indeed addresses this type of R&D.  
We implement this test on financial constraints empirically by investigating R&D investments 
of product innovators, where the type of R&D with respect to the degree of innovativeness is 
considered as being decisive for financial constraints. On the one hand, we define firms 
pursuing cutting-edge R&D as those that aim at introducing market novelties. The control 
group of routine R&D performers consists of firms that mainly aim at improving existing 
products or pure imitation.  
Furthermore, this study accounts for a widely discussed methodological critique formulated 
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) on earlier studies. They question the approach of identifying 
financial constraints by estimating investment-cash flow relationships and call for further 
research where financial constraints are not identified indirectly through investment-cash flow 
sensitivities, but observed more directly. Our contribution follows this by making use of a 
credit rating index which constitutes a direct observation of expected credit market 
constraints. 
 Using panel data, we show that firms pursuing cutting-edge R&D strategies are subject to 
financial constraints in the credit market. Our indicator, a credit rating index, turns out to 
curtail R&D spending for cutting-edge R&D while it does not for routine R&D investment. 
Moreover, we complement the finding of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) that the investment-
cash flow sensitivity is not monotonically increasing with the level of constriction by 
identifying such a monotonic relationship between the credit rating index and R&D 
investment. 
This finding has important implications for innovation policy. We can assume that cutting-
edge innovations are the driving force of technological progress, and thus yield higher social 
returns than routine R&D projects in the long run. Our results, however, show that such 
investments are subject to binding credit market constraints. This may call for policy 
measures towards cutting-edge R&D projects. It would be interesting for further research to 
investigate whether current policies address those investments. In many European countries, it 
is current practice that grant proposals for public R&D funding are evaluated with respect to 
expected economic returns and technological feasibility. It may apply exactly to cutting-edge 
research, though, that expert reviewers consider daring and visionary projects as not feasible 
or too uncertain, so that public subsidies may not be granted. If so, projects with potentially 
high social returns may be judged as inferior to more routine R&D projects. 
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Abstract 
We analyze financial constraints for R&D, where we account for heterogeneity 
among investments which has been neglected in previous literature. According to 
economic theory, investments should be distinguished by their degree of 
uncertainty, e.g. routine R&D versus cutting-edge R&D. Financial constraints 
should be more binding for cutting-edge R&D than for routine R&D. Using panel 
data we find that R&D spending of firms devoting a significant fraction of R&D 
to cutting-edge projects is curtailed by credit constraints while routine R&D 
investments are not. This has important policy implications with respect to the 
distribution of R&D subsidies in the economy. 
 
 
 
Keywords: R&D, Financial Constraints, Panel Data  
JEL-Classification: O31, O32 
 
 
 
 
Address:  Hanna L. Binz 
  KU Leuven 
  Steunpunt O&O Indicatoren 
  Dekenstraat 2 
  3000 Leuven 
  Belgium 
 
Phone: +32 16 325 793 
E-Mail:  hanna.binz@econ.kuleuven.be  
 Dirk Czarnitzki 
 KU Leuven 
 Dept. of Managerial Economics, Strategy  
    and Innovation 
 Naamsestraat 69 
 3000 Leuven 
 Belgium 
 +32 16 326 906 
 dirk.czarnitzki@econ.kuleuven.be 
  
 
 
* We are grateful to the team members of the Mannheim Innovation Panel for providing 
the survey data, and to Creditreform for the rating data. We also thank Jürgen Moka for 
his help in data processing, and the participants of the ZEW Workshop on the Economics 
of Innovation (December 2007) for helpful comments.
  1
1 Introduction 
Investment in research and development (R&D) is usually considered to be subject to 
financing constraints due to outcome uncertainty leading to asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders (Arrow 1962, Nelson 1959, Hall et al. 1992, Lach and Schankerman 
1988, Harhoff et al. 1999 and Mansfield et al. 1977). Moreover, R&D investment typically 
has a low inside collateral value as it is sunk once expensed. These arguments on market 
failures are often used to justify governmental intervention in the market for R&D through 
subsidy grants and tax credits. While the empirical literature on detecting financial constraints 
for R&D is vast (see Hall, 2002, for a survey), results are often ambiguous1. However, these 
studies may deliver inconclusive results due to the conceptual set-up of many empirical 
studies or limitations in data availability. In many of these studies only large, stock market 
listed firms are being considered (see for example Scherer 1965, Mueller 1967, Elliot 1971). 
Yet, we argue that the inconclusiveness may be due to heterogeneity among R&D 
investments that has been neglected in previous literature. 
In a theoretical model, Kamien and Schwartz (1978) distinguish firms doing routine R&D to 
strengthen their established product lines and firms investing in more fundamental R&D 
projects aiming at more radical market innovations. According to this distinction, the former -
defensive R&D- firms, are less likely to face financial constraints for their activities than the 
latter -offensive R&D- firms. Since large innovations involving basic research require 
significantly more resources, are much riskier in terms of default and expected returns, and 
are more prone to secrecy issues, the acquisition of external capital may be curtailed. If this 
applies empirically, it has strong implications for innovation policy. As cutting-edge 
innovations are typically seen as the driving force of technological progress and long-term 
growth, it is questionable whether current policy practice aimed at alleviating financial 
constraints indeed addresses cutting-edge type R&D.  
                                                 
1 For example, Chiao (2002) finds a negative influence of debt on R&D spending in science-based industries, but 
a positive one in non-science based industries indicating that risk is significantly lower in the latter. Hall (1992), 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Harhoff (1998) find a positive relationship between R&D and cash flow for 
the U.S. Bond et al. (2006) find that cash flow predicts whether a firm does R&D or not in the UK, but not the 
level of R&D indicating that UK firms that do R&D are a self-selected group that face fewer constraints. Yet, 
they find no such effects for Germany. Mulkay et al. (2001) find that cash flow impacts more in the U.S. than in 
France both for R&D and ordinary investment. Baghat and Welch (1995) found similar results for the U.S. and 
U.K. as well as Bougheas et al. (2003) for Ireland (see Hall 2002 for a survey). 
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We implement this test on financial constraints empirically by investigating R&D investments 
of product innovators, where the type of R&D with respect to the degree of innovativeness is 
considered as being decisive for financial constraints. On the one hand, we define firms 
pursuing cutting-edge R&D as those that aim at introducing market novelties. The control 
group of routine R&D performers consists of firms that mainly aim at improving existing 
products or pure imitation. We argue that cutting-edge R&D performers may well follow 
more risky investment strategies than others. Therefore, we believe that this is an empirical 
approximation of the notion of risky investment behavior as indicated in the theoretical model 
by Kamien & Schwartz (1978).  
Furthermore, this study accounts for a widely discussed methodological critique formulated 
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Due to the specific characteristics of R&D investment, 
scholars argued that firms have to rely to a great extent on internal sources of financing for 
their R&D projects. Thus, firms regarded as unconstrained or less constrained are those with 
relatively high liquidity. In a seminal paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) suggest to investigate 
financial constraints by estimating investment-cash flow relationships. For this, they grouped 
their sample of firms into potentially unconstrained and constrained firms according to 
dividend pay-outs. If the investment of the potentially constrained group is more sensitive to 
internal financial resources than that of the other, one would conclude that the credit market 
would curtail investments of these firms. This methodology has been adopted by many 
subsequent studies (see the survey by Hall, 2002).  
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) heavily criticized this methodological approach, though. Using 
the potentially constrained firms of the study by Fazzari et al. (1988), they show that the 
investment-cash flow relationship may not be appropriate to judge about financial constraints. 
Kaplan and Zingales split the sample into different groups of firms ranging from definitely 
constrained to not constraint firms. Rather than using an ad-hoc grouping, they created ratings 
by carefully combining annual report data with qualitative evidence from management reports 
on liquidity and other sources. They show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not 
monotonically increasing with the level of constriction. Hence, this study places high doubts 
on earlier research and, consequently, calls for further research where financial constraints, 
are not identified indirectly through investment-cash flow sensitivities, but observed more 
directly. 
 “The final implication of our paper is a methodological one. Our research design 
and results point out what we think is a weakness in existing research as well as 
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an opportunity for future research. A great deal can be learned trough more direct 
observation.” (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997: p. 212). 
Our contribution follows the advice of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) by making use of a credit 
rating index which constitutes a direct observation of expected credit market constraints. The 
credit rating index is generated by Germany’s largest rating agency and serves us as indicator 
of firms’ ability to raise external funds for their R&D investment.2  
To sum up, we estimate an equation such as R&D = f(Credit Rating, Controls) for firms 
conducting cutting-edge R&D (RISK = 1) and those performing more routine R&D (RISK = 
0). Note that this grouping is not related to the idea of Fazzari et al. (1988) who need to split 
the sample in order to identify financial constraints through different cash flow-investment 
sensitivities. We observe the level of constriction directly through the credit rating, which is a 
continuous measure (an index from 100 to 600). If we were only interested in the question if 
and to what extent credit market restriction curtail firm level investment, we would not split 
the sample, but simply run regressions in the total sample. The effect of credit constraints 
would be identified through the variation in the rating variable and its estimated coefficient. 
However, as we follow Kamien and Schwartz who argue that potential credit market 
restrictions are less binding for routine R&D investments than for cutting-edge R&D 
investments, we split our sample in two groups to account for the heterogeneous nature of 
R&D investments. 
We show that firms pursuing cutting-edge R&D strategies are subject to financial constraints 
in the credit market. Our indicator, a credit rating index, turns out to curtail R&D spending for 
cutting-edge R&D while it does not for routine R&D investment. Moreover, we complement 
the finding of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not 
monotonically increasing with the level of constriction by identifying such a monotonic 
relationship between the credit rating index and R&D investment. 
Section 2 presents the database and variables, section 3 set-up and results of the empirical 
analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
2 See Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007) for an analysis of the usefulness of credit rating information. Czarnitzki (2006) 
provides evidence on the relationship between R&D policy (subsidies) and financial constraints in small and 
medium enterprises using credit rating information. 
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2 Data and empirical set-up 
Our data stem from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which is an annual survey in the 
German business sector conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), 
Mannheim. The MIP started in 1992 as German part of the European-wide Community 
Innovation Survey with the aim to provide key innovation data for policy and research 
purposes. The survey identifies process and product innovators as well as non-innovative 
firms in manufacturing and service industries. Our study uses the survey from the 
manufacturing sector. The subsample of product innovators allows us to implement the theory 
derived distinction of defensive versus offensive R&D. Product innovative firms can be 
differentiated into original innovators and imitators. Imitators are those firms that indicate to 
introduce new products that were only new to the firms’ product portfolio but that were not 
new to the market (RISK = 0). Original inventors, on the contrary, introduce market novelties.  
How to define a cutting-edge R&D performer? We split the sample according to the 
distribution of the sales share achieved with market novelties (NOVEL) at the firm level 
averages (not based on firm-year observations). 38% of product innovators are pure imitators, 
i.e. their sales with market novelties are always zero. The median of NOVEL amounts to 
2.5%, and the 75% quantile of the distribution is at a novelty sales share of 7.5%. We 
estimated several versions of our models. The subsequently presented results are based on a 
1/3 versus 2/3 sample split: a product innovator is defined as cutting-edge R&D performer 
(RISK = 1) if NOVEL > 5% of total sales during our observed time period, on average. The 
other group is denoted as RISK = 0. Note, however, that other definitions, such as sample 
split at 2.5% (at the median) or 7.5% (at the 3rd quartile) result in the same conclusions (see 
appendix). 
Our sample covers the 1993 to 2002 period. We have an unbalanced panel of 1,252 firm-year 
observations (354 different firms) on firms following cutting-edge R&D investment strategies 
(NOVEL > 5%) and are thus more prone to be financially constrained than our control group. 
The latter consists of 2,642 firm-year observations (742 different firms) on firms devoting 
most of their innovation effort towards imitation. The panel is unbalanced. While the data 
cover a time period of 10 years, 40% of firms are observed only two or three times in the 
panel, another 40% are observed between four and six times, and the final 20% more 
frequently (up to nine times). 
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Note that we use a sample which is more representative of the economy than those used in 
several earlier studies, where scholars had to restrict their analysis to large R&D-performing 
firms due to limitations in data availability. Due to a large fraction of small firms (median size 
= 180 employees; a quarter of firms is smaller than 55 employees), firms may not conduct 
R&D in every year. We take this censoring of the dependent variable into account by 
estimating censored regression models (Tobit). Due to the skewness of the distribution, we 
use R&D expenditure measured as ln(1+R&D) as dependent variable in all regressions.3 
The most important right-hand side variable is the credit rating reflecting access to external 
capital. The credit rating is an index between 100 and 600, where an index of 600 indicates 
the worst rating (RATING).  
While we do not rely on the identification of constraints through investment-cash flow 
relationships, we still control for the availability of internal funds. The most commonly used 
measure of internal financial resources is cash flow. As our sample, however, is not limited to 
large firms which are obliged to publish balance sheet information, we have no cash flow 
information. Instead, we calculate the empirical price-cost margin as  
(  -   -     & )  Sales Staff Cost Material Cost R DPCM
Sales
δ+ ⋅= , 
which has been used widely in the literature (e.g. Collins and Preston 1969, Ravenscraft 
1983). Since R&D is an expense, the decision to invest in R&D will decrease PCM in the 
corresponding period. As we want to measure internally available funds during the year 
irrespective of the actual decision on investment, it is common to add the R&D expenses back 
into PCM (cf. Harhoff 1998). As PCM does not account for capital cost, we only add the staff 
and material cost shares of R&D. These amount to 93% (δ = 0.93) according to the 
Wissenschaftsstatistik (1999) which is the official German R&D statistic. 
Further control variables are firm size measured by the number of employees (EMP) and the 
capital intensity (KAPINT = tangible assets / EMP) as capital intensive firms may conduct 
more R&D as they rely more on technological improvements than labor intensive producers. 
Furthermore, capital may serve as collateral in credit negotiations with potential lenders, 
facilitating access to external sources of financing. We also use firms’ age (AGE) to control 
                                                 
3 R&D expenditure is measured in million “Deutsche Mark” (1 DM ≈ 0.51 EUR). 
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for age-related effects, e.g. younger firms may conduct more R&D ceteris paribus than older 
firms as those could have more established products in the market. Finally, a set of 8 time 
dummies controls for business cycle effects, and 10 industry dummies (only included in 
pooled cross-sectional regressions) control for variation of R&D intensity across sectors. We 
use lagged values of all time variant variables (except age) to avoid direct simultaneity 
between R&D and explanatory variables. 
Descriptive statistics for both groups (RISK = 0 and RISK = 1) are presented in Table 1. The 
firms in the RISK = 0 group are on average 52 years old, while the RISK = 1 firms are 
slightly younger (about 47 years). However, the firms in the latter group are bigger in terms of 
average employment, e.g. 621 compared to 478 in the RISK = 0 group. Firms in both groups 
show about the same capital intensity. Furthermore, we see that those firms following a – 
according to our definition - more risky R&D strategy indeed spend considerably more on 
R&D than the control group. Moreover, Table 1 show those firms have a slightly higher 
price-cost-margin the firms in our non-risky control group.4  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable RISK = 0 
(2,642 obs.) 
RISK = 1 
(1,252 obs.) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R&Dit 3.736 29.269 0 866.739 11.556 73.548 0 1,291.094
EMPi,t-1 477.712 1,450.847 2 28,400 621.014 2,007.068 3 47138
KAPINTi,t-1 0.089 0.098 0.001 0.791 0.083 0.093 0.002 0.799
PCMi,t-1 0.270 0.150 -0.377 0.814 0.304 0.159 -0.338 0.825
AGEit 52.168 42.274 1 202 46.666 40.807 0 186
RATINGit-1/100 2.004 0.580 1 6 1.968 0.426 1 6
Note: time and industry dummies omitted. 
3 Econometric Analysis 
We employ three different models to our panel data, a pooled cross-sectional approach, a 
random effects estimator and a modification of the latter by Wooldridge (2002). The model 
can be written as 
                                                 
4 The relatively large difference of average R&D spending between groups is to a large extent due to a few huge 
firms that spent more than 100 million Deutsche Mark on average. Taking those out of the sample, does not 
alternate any of the findings. 
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where yit is the dependent variable, xit denotes the set of regressors, β the parameters to be 
estimated, and ci the unobserved firm-specific effect, and uit is the error term. We estimate 
three versions of this model. First, we assume that ci = 0, and thus the model can be estimated 
as a simple pooled cross-sectional model, where we adjust the standard errors for firm clusters 
to account for the panel structure of the data. Thus, we allow the error terms to be correlated 
within firm observations. The pooled model has the advantage that it is not necessary to 
maintain the strict exogeneity assumption. While uit certainly has to be independent of xit, the 
relationship between uit and xis, t ≠ s, is not specified (see Wooldridge, 2002: 538). Hence, the 
model allows, for instance, for feedback of R&D in period t to the regressors in future 
periods. In the second version of the model, we apply a random-effects Tobit panel estimator 
so that ci ≠ 0. However, this requires the strict exogeneity assumption. In addition, the 
random-effects Tobit requires the assumption that ci is uncorrelated with xit. The latter is 
relaxed in the third version of the model where we follow Wooldridge who presented a 
modification of the random effects Tobit in spirit of the Chamberlain (1982, 1984) method 
that allows correlation between uit and ci. We assume 
( )2| , ,i i i a
i i i
c x N x
c x a
ψ ξ σ
ψ ξ
+
= + +
∼
 
so that we estimate a random-effects Tobit model in following modified version 
( )max 0,it it i i ity x x a uψ β ξ= + + + + . 
We can test if ξ = 0, and the model would reduce to the traditional random-effects model, 
where the firm-specific effects are not correlated with the error term. 
Table 2 presents the regression results for both firm groups respectively, i.e. RISK = 0 are the 
routine R&D performers and RISK = 1 are the cutting-edge R&D performers. The first two 
columns are pooled cross-sectional estimates, the third and fourth are random-effects Tobits 
that account for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in investment behavior under the 
assumption that the regressors are not correlated with the firm-specific effects. The 
Wooldridge estimator in columns 5 and 6 relaxes this assumption. 
In the pooled cross-sectional model, we find that both groups’ investment behavior is affected 
by the availability of internal funds measured through PCM. However, the access to the credit 
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market as measured by the credit rating only restricts the investment of firms with more risky 
or offensive R&D (RISK = 1). Recall that a larger value of RATING indicates a worse rating, 
and thus the negative sign of the coefficient describes a reduction in R&D with increasing 
values of the rating.  
In the random-effects panel models, we find that the routine R&D performers (RISK = 0) are 
not subject to credit market constraints as predicted by Kamien and Schwartz (1978). For the 
offensive R&D performers, the previous results are confirmed. Financial constraints 
constitute binding restrictions for R&D investment. This model also indicates that there is 
unobserved heterogeneity in the panel.  
The Wooldridge model shows that the assumption of uncorrelatedness between the firm-
specific effect and the regressors is rejected: several of the variables’ “within” means are 
individually significant and they are jointly significant altogether. Thus the Wooldridge model 
is preferable over the standard random effects model. Again, the previous results are 
confirmed. While credit market restrictions apply to firms conducting cutting edge R&D, they 
are not binding for routine R&D performers. 
Table 3 presents the result of Tobit regression models under a different specification of the 
rating index we use. Here we define rating classes, where we split this indicator into four 
categories defined by the quartiles of the rating distribution, so that each group contains 25% 
of the observations. In the regressions, we now use three dummy variables, B, C and D, where 
D indicates the worst rating. The group with best ratings, A, serves as reference group. 
This is related to the tests Kaplan and Zingales (1997) employed when they rejected the 
usefulness of investment-cash flow relationships as they did not find a monotonic relationship 
between cash flow sensitivity and level of constriction. The results from this specification 
confirm our earlier results, and the models reveal that there strict monotonic relationship 
between our indicator (RATING_B, RATING_C, RATING_D) and R&D investment. Consider the 
random effects model: the coefficient of rating B amounts to -0.055 indicating that the B 
group conducts slightly less R&D than the reference group. The coefficient of the C group is -
0.155 and the one of the D group equals -0.206. We thus find R&D monotonically decreasing 
with the level of constriction. The same applies to the pooled cross-sectional estimates. The 
coefficients are jointly significant in the regressions. Note that it is important to distinguish 
the heterogeneity of investments in the spirit of Kamien and Schwartz, though. In the group 
RISK = 0, the ratings’ coefficients are all insignificant and they do not show a monotonic 
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relationship. Thus, one would not find convincing results with respect to financial constraints 
if we had used the full sample without making explicitly a distinction with respect to the 
heterogeneity of R&D investments, cutting-edge versus routine project.  
Note that the Wooldridge model collapses with this specification as there is too much 
multicollinearity between the rating classes and their within firm means.  
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Table 2: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), 2642 (1252) obs. for RISK = 0 (RISK = 1) 
 Pooled Cross Section Model Random-Effects Panel Model Wooldridge Model 
Variable Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 
ln(EMPi,t-1) -0.346*** -0.670*** -0.163** -0.469 *** 0.269  -0.469 ** 
 (0.117) (0.108) (0.098) (0.108)  (0.225)  (0.213)  
ln(EMPi,t-1)2 0.087*** 0.117*** 0.067*** 0.094 *** 0.010  0.062 *** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.017)  
ln(AGEit) 0.027 -0.041 -0.012 -0.031  0.013  -0.039  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.041)  (0.143)  (0.156)  
KAPINTi,t-1 0.556 0.198 0.653*** -0.129  0.717 *** -0.374  
 (0.359) (0.302) (0.227) (0.294)  (0.280)  (0.397)  
PCMi,t-1 0.580*** 0.676*** 0.122 0.465 *** -0.420  0.158  
 (0.171) (0.188) (0.130) (0.145)  (0.144)  (0.162)  
RATING i,t-1/100 0.003 -0.219*** -0.007 -0.196 *** 0.005  -0.160 ** 
 (0.046) (0.078) (0.044) (0.062)  (0.059 (0.072)  
Mean[ln(EMPi,t-1)]     -0.663 *** -0.150  
     (0.245  (0.249)  
Mean[ln(EMPi,t-1)2]     0.082 *** 0.053 ** 
     (0.020)  (0.021)  
Mean[ln(AGEit)]     -0.041  -0.097  
     (0.147)  (0.162)  
Mean(KAPINTi,t-1)     -0.666  0.040  
     (0.483)  (0.577)  
Mean(PCMi,t-1)     0.823 *** 1.131 *** 
     (0.316)  (0.336)  
Mean(RATINGi,t-1/100)     0.006  0.013  
     (0.086)  (0.130)  
Test on joint significance of time dummies [χ2 (8)] 47.69*** 45.27*** 54.48*** 41.35*** 52.73*** 39.33*** 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies [χ2 (10)] 123.72*** 119.23*** -- -- -- -- 
Test on joint significance of variable means [χ2 (6)] -- -- -- -- 39.61*** 59.81*** 
Log-Likelihood -2,448.27 -1,350.21 -2,175.99 -1,281.35 -2,156.48 -1,252.20 
ρ -- -- 0.644 0.545 0.640 0.542 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5 ,10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table 3: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), 2642 (1252) obs. for RISK = 0 (RISK = 1) for RATING classes 
 Pooled Cross Section Model Random-Effects Panel Model 
Variable Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 
ln(EMPi,t-1) -0.342*** -0.671*** -0.169* -0.556 *** 
 (0.117) (0.106) (0.090) (0.100)  
ln(EMPi,t-1)2 0.087*** 0.117*** 0.066*** 0.103 *** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)  
ln(AGEit) 0.026 -0.047 -0.012 -0.027  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.037)  
KAPINTi,t-1 0.554 0.177 0.739*** 0.081  
 (0.359) (0.308) (0.222) (0.280)  
PCMi,t-1 0.564*** 0.683*** 0.159 0.426 *** 
 (0.169) (0.187) (0.127) (0.145)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_B 0.005 -0.081 0.006 -0.055  
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.056) (0.067)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_C 0.032 -0.225*** 0.044 -0.155 ** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.065) (0.077)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_D -0.062 -0.255*** -0.049 -0.206 *** 
 (0.086) (0.091) (0.061) (0.072)  
Test on joint significance of 
time dummies [χ2 (8)] 47.46*** 45.20*** 58.22*** 39.62*** 
Test on joint significance of 
RATING variables [χ2 (3)] 1.54 10.47** 2.77 10.06 ** 
Test on joint significance of 
industry dummies [χ2 (10)] 124.62*** 122.10*** 149.74*** 104.85*** 
Log-Likelihood -2,447.12 -1,348.48 -2,105.36 -1,281.35 
ρ -- -- 0.440 0.578 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-
sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5 ,10%). ρ indicates the share of the total 
variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  12
4 Conclusions 
This paper revisited the discussion on financial constraints for R&D investment. As studies on 
investment-cash flow relationships have been criticized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we 
suggest to overcome these limitations by using a credit rating index that directly measures the 
expected level of constriction. Furthermore, we account for the heterogeneity of R&D 
investments by grouping the sample into potentially constrained and unconstrained firms 
based on Kamien and Schwartz (1978). They suggest that R&D of a more risky nature will be 
difficult to finance by external resources where less risky R&D may not be subject to binding 
financial constraints. We implement this empirically by grouping the sample into routine 
versus cutting-edge R&D performers. Using panel data, we show that firms pursuing cutting-
edge R&D strategies are subject to financial constraints in the credit market. Our indicator, a 
credit rating index, turns out to curtail R&D spending for cutting-edge R&D while it does not 
for routine R&D investment. 
This finding has important implications for innovation policy. We can assume that cutting-
edge innovations are the driving force of technological progress, and thus yield higher social 
returns than routine R&D projects in the long run. Our results, however, show that such 
investments are subject to binding credit market constraints. This may call for policy 
measures towards cutting-edge R&D projects. It would be interesting for further research to 
investigate whether current policies address those investments. In many European countries, it 
is current practice that grant proposals for public R&D funding are evaluated with respect to 
expected economic returns and technological feasibility. It may apply exactly to cutting-edge 
research, though, that expert reviewers consider daring and visionary projects as not feasible 
or too uncertain, so that public subsidies may not be granted. If so, projects with potentially 
high social returns may be judged as inferior to more routine R&D projects. 
Finally it should be noted that our study is not without limitations. As we do not have long 
time-series data for many firms in our sample, we are unable to calculate an R&D stock. This 
would be necessary to estimate Euler equations or error correction models which are 
theoretically founded models of investment behavior that map the inter-temporal optimization 
problem between the size of investments and the level of R&D stocks. While those models 
have been applied in many studies, we can only use their ingredients, but have to depart with 
the specification from the theory-grounded choice due to data restrictions.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Distribution of NOVEL in the sample 
Share of sales with market 
novelties Relative Frequency Cumulative relative frequency 
0 37% 37% 
(0 – 2.5%] 15% 52% 
(2.5% – 5%] 15% 67% 
(5% - 7.5%] 7% 74% 
(7.5% - 10%] 6% 80% 
(10% - 15%] 8% 88% 
more than 15% 12% 100% 
 100%  
 
 
The regressions discussed in the text of the paper define the upper 33% of the distribution 
(cut-off at 5%) as cutting-edge R&D performers. The following tables A.2 and A.3 use 
(about) the upper quartile (cut-off at 7.5%) of NOVEL as cutting-edge R&D performers. As 
further check, we defined the cut-off at (about) the median of the distribution with NOVEL at 
2.5%. See Tables A.4 and A.5. All results discussed with the other specification remain 
robust. 
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Table A.2: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), 2913 (981) obs. for RISK = 0 (RISK = 1) with NOVEL-split at 7.5% 
 Pooled Cross Section Model Random-Effects Panel Model Wooldridge Model 
Variable Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 
ln(EMPi,t-1) -0.372*** -0.709*** -0.168* -0.544 *** 0.151  -0.376 ** 
 (0.108) (0.115) (0.091) (0.121)  (0.209)  (0.215)  
ln(EMPi,t-1)2 0.089*** 0.122*** 0.067*** 0.100 *** 0.019  0.053 *** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.018)  
ln(AGEit) 0.001 0.010 -0.029 -0.010  0.014  0.010  
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.032) (0.045)  (0.134)  (0.167)  
KAPINTi,t-1 0.455 0.400 0.511** 0.110  0.548 *** -0.079  
 (0.328) (0.351) (0.220) (0.313)  (0.279)  (0.389)  
PCMi,t-1 0.655*** 0.781*** 0.150 0.501 *** -0.075  0.238  
 (0.165) (0.199) (0.127) (0.146)  (0.142)  (0.157)  
RATING i,t-1/100 -0.019 -0.251*** -0.036 -0.189 *** 0.023  -0.171 ** 
 (0.045) (0.080) (0.042) (0.069)  (0.055)  (0.080)  
Mean[ln(EMPi,t-1)]     -0.514 *** -0.429  
     (0.230)  (0.259)  
Mean[ln(EMPi,t-1)2]     0.069 *** 0.080 ** 
     (0.019)  (0.022)  
Mean[ln(AGEit)]     -0.058  -0.053  
     (0.138)  (0.627)  
Mean(KAPINTi,t-1)     -0.468  -0.173  
     (0.455)  (0.627)  
Mean(PCMi,t-1)     1.025 *** 1.037 *** 
     (0.301)  (0.353)  
Mean(RATINGi,t-1/100)     0.012  0.060  
     (0.082)  (0.143)  
Test on joint significance of time dummies [χ2 (8)] 55.26*** 25.31** 68.23*** 26.44*** 68.42*** 24.09*** 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies [χ2 (10)] 134.93*** 125.78*** -- -- -- -- 
Test on joint significance of variable means [χ2 (6)] -- -- -- -- 43.93*** 66.79*** 
Log-Likelihood -2,787.37 -1,009.15 -2,507.57 -947.10 -2,485.92 -914.85 
ρ -- -- 0.624 0.588 0.640 0.584 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5 ,10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table A.3: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), 2913 (981) obs. for RISK = 0 (RISK = 1) for RATING classes with NOVEL-split at 7.5% 
 Pooled Cross Section Model Random-Effects Panel Model 
Variable Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 
ln(EMPi,t-1) -0.383*** -0.712*** -0.213* -0.588 *** 
 (0.108) (0.115) (0.084) (0.110)  
ln(EMPi,t-1)2 0.090*** 0.123*** 0.069*** 0.107 *** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)  
ln(AGEit) -0.005 -0.013 0.044 -0.010  
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.030) (0.040)  
KAPINTi,t-1 0.446 0.377 0.608*** 0.367  
 (0.330) (0.361) (0.215) (0.298)  
PCMi,t-1 0.641*** 0.804*** 0.195 0.487 *** 
 (0.162) (0.200) (0.124) (0.145)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_B 0.008 -0.043 0.006 -0.005  
 (0.078) (0.090) (0.046) (0.070)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_C -0.026 -0.187*** -0.005 -0.098  
 (0.083) (0.099) (0.062) (0.081)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_D -0.120 -0.247*** -0.099* -0.194 *** 
 (0.080) (0.092) (0.058) (0.074)  
Test on joint significance of 
time dummies [χ2 (8)] 55.31*** 25.57*** 71.91*** 24.26*** 
Test on joint significance of 
RATING variables [χ2 (3)] 3.89 9.37** 4.68 9.42** 
Test on joint significance of 
industry dummies [χ2 (10)] 136.57*** 126.31*** 165.05*** 96.49*** 
Log-Likelihood -2,784.63 -1,009.48 -2,430.09 -906.04 
ρ -- -- 0.555 0.477 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 
1% (5 ,10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table A.4: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), 2068 (1826) obs. for RISK = 0 (RISK = 1) with NOVEL-split at 2.5% 
 Pooled Cross Section Model Random-Effects Panel Model Wooldridge Model 
Variable Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 
ln(EMPi,t-1) -0.361*** -0.682*** -0.200* -0.482 *** 0.280  -0.382 ** 
 (0.132) (0.100) (0.111) (0.098)  (0.262)  (0.192)  
ln(EMPi,t-1)2 0.089*** 0.117*** 0.070*** 0.094 *** 0.003  0.059 *** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.016)  
ln(AGEit) 0.018 -0.024 -0.005 -0.022  -0.118  0.158  
 (0.043) (0.032) (0.041) (0.033)  (0.176)  (0.132)  
KAPINTi,t-1 0.654 0.347 0.628** 0.138  0.624 * 0.094  
 (0.420) (0.277) (0.277) (0.240)  (0.351)  (0.309)  
PCMi,t-1 0.413* 0.755*** 0.009 0.432 *** -0.134  0.174  
 (0.212) (0.159) (0.054) (0.119)  (0.184)  (0.132)  
RATING i,t-1/100 -0.031 -0.167*** 0.011 -0.147 *** -0.062  -0.140 ** 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.054) (0.047)  (0.077)  (0.056)  
Mean[ln(EMPi,t-1)]     -0.764 *** -0.443  
     (0.283)  (0.224)  
Mean[ln(EMPi,t-1)2]     0.098 *** 0.053 *** 
     (0.023)  (0.019)  
Mean[ln(AGEit)]     0.100  -0.202  
     (0.182)  (0.136)  
Mean(KAPINTi,t-1)     -0.659  -0.232  
     (0.578)  (0.481)  
Mean(PCMi,t-1)     0.617  1.140 *** 
     (0.389)  (0.283)  
Mean(RATINGi,t-1/100)     -0.056  0.050  
     (0.107)  (0.096)  
Test on joint significance of time dummies [χ2 (8)] 29.37*** 62.72*** 37.56*** 55.67*** 33.57*** 57.62*** 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies [χ2 (10)] 92.54*** 148.46*** -- -- -- -- 
Test on joint significance of variable means [χ2 (6)] -- -- -- -- 38.43*** 62.65*** 
Log-Likelihood -1,802.32 -1,944.28 -1,622.38 -1810.84 -1,603.52 -1780.15 
ρ -- -- 0.624 0.589 0.614 0.583 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5 ,10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table A.5: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), 2068 (1826) obs. for RISK = 0 (RISK = 1) for RATING classes with NOVEL-split at 2.5% 
 Pooled Cross Section Model Random-Effects Panel Model 
Variable Risk = 0 Risk = 1 Risk = 0 Risk = 1 
ln(EMPi,t-1) -0.376*** -0.688*** -0.204** -0.542 *** 
 (0.132) (0.101) (0.103) (0.190)  
ln(EMPi,t-1)2 0.090*** 0.118*** 0.070*** 0.100 *** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)  
ln(AGEit) -0.009 -0.031 0.012 -0.001  
 (0.422) (0.032) (0.038) (0.030)  
KAPINTi,t-1 0.626 0.349 0.710*** 0.365  
 (0.330) (0.279) (0.272) (0.231)  
PCMi,t-1 0.422** 0.759*** 0.195 0.435 *** 
 (0.209) (0.158) (0.124) (0.118)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_B 0.091 -0.082 0.101 -0.005  
 (0.106) (0.073) (0.072) (0.070)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_C 0.014 -0.152** 0.043 -0.098  
 (0.114) (0.074) (0.082) (0.081)  
RATINGi,t-1/100_D -0.023 -0.243*** -0.019 -0.194 *** 
 (0.106) (0.072) (0.077) (0.074)  
Test on joint significance of 
time dummies [χ2 (8)] 30.24*** 63.07*** 42.26*** 55.40*** 
Test on joint significance of 
RATING variables [χ2 (3)] 1.65 12.24*** 3.17 13.35** 
Test on joint significance of 
industry dummies [χ2 (10)] 91.95*** 149.29*** 102.22*** 144.71*** 
Log-Likelihood -1,801.17 -1,941.69 -1,572.75 -1,746.75 
ρ -- -- 0.552 0.494 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled 
cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5 ,10%). ρ indicates the share of the 
total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
 
 
 
